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ABSTRACT 
The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its accompanying Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP) missions can be tools used to increase the international profile of the European 
Union. Nevertheless, CSDP missions garner little news coverage. This article argues that the very 
nature  of  the  missions  themselves  makes  them  poor  vehicles  for  EU  promotion  for  political, 
institutional, and logistical reasons. By definition, they are conducted in the middle of crises, making 
news  coverage  politically  sensitive.  The  very  act  of  reporting  could  undermine  the  mission. 
Institutionally,  all  CSDP  missions  are  intergovernmental,  making  press  statements  slow,  overly 
bureaucratic, and of little interest to journalists. Logistically, the missions are often located in remote, 
undeveloped parts of the world, making it difficult and expensive for European and international 
journalists to cover. Moreover, these regions in crisis seldom have a thriving, local free press. Using 
the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) as a case study, the author concludes that although a mission 
may do good, CSDP missions cannot fulfil the political function of raising the profile of the EU. 
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Monitoring Mission 
 
STEPHANIE ANDERSON 
1 
Introduction 
One  of  the  stated  objectives  behind  the  Common 
Foreign  and  Security  Policy  (CFSP)  and  Common 
Security  and  Defence  Policy  (CSDP)  missions  is  to 
increase  the  international  profile  of  the  European 
Union (EU). However, the very nature of the missions 
themselves  makes  them  poor  vehicles  for  EU 
promotion.  Even  when  they  are  successful,  their 
attributes make EU publicity extremely difficult. First, 
politically, they are almost always the result of closed-
door  negotiations,  and  therefore  do  not  lend 
themselves  to  publicity.  Institutionally,  they  are 
always  de  facto  coalitions  of  the  willing,  with  few 
public  relations  resources  and  many  masters.  As  a 
result,  press  statements  are  the  product  of  lowest 
common denominator agreements by the 27 member 
states, and of little interest to journalists. Logistically, 
CSDP  missions  are  usually  located  in  remote, 
undeveloped  parts  of  the  world,  often  without  a 
thriving,  local  free  press,  making  it  difficult  and 
expensive for European and international journalists 
to cover. Using the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) 
as a case study, the author concludes that although a 
mission may do good, CSDP missions cannot fulfil the 
political function of raising the profile of the EU. 
The  first  section  of  the  paper  explains  the  political 
premise of using CSDP missions and the Aceh mission 
in particular to showcase the EU. Using data from a 
quantitative  content  analysis,  the  author 
demonstrates that this policy disappoints; in general, 
CSDP  missions  are  not  newsworthy  and  do  not 
succeed in raising the Union’s profile. Aceh, although 
undeniably  successful,  had  minimal  press  coverage. 
The paper then uses a qualitative analysis to explain 
                                                      
1 Stephanie Anderson was a Visiting Fellow at the EU Centre 
in Singapore, and is currently Associate Professor at the 
University of Wyoming. The views expressed in this working 
paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect 
the views of the EU Centre in Singapore. 
how  the  very  nature  of  CSDP  missions  undermines 
their use as a political promotion tool. 
Visibility and the CSDP: Increasing the EU’s 
International Prestige and Support among its 
Citizens
2 
The  EU’s  foreign  and security  policy  is  supposed to 
increase  its  profile  both  at  home  and  abroad.  The 
Maastricht Treaty on European Union (1993) stated 
that one of the main goals of the newly established 
Common Foreign and Security Policy was to "assert its 
identity  on  the  international  scene."  This  goal  was 
reiterated in the Saint-Mâlo Declaration in December 
1998, which led to the formation of the subsequent 
European Security and Defence Policy
3 “in order that 
Europe c[ould] make its voice heard in world affairs.” 
According  to  the  2003  Concept  for  EU  Monitoring 
Missions,  one  of  the  “basic  principles”  was  to 
“enhance  EU  visibility”.  In  2010,  the  European 
External  Action  Service  (EEAS)  was  established  with 
the  same  goal  in  mind:  to  “increase  the  Union’s 
political  and  economic  influence  in  the  world.”
4 
Commission spokeswoman Pia Arkenhilde explained, 
“It's obvious that visibility is part of being effective. 
It's important for the recipients of the aid to know 
who they are dealing with and for the European tax 
payer, the donors of the aid, to see the actions on the 
ground, in terms of their future engagement.”
 5  
CSDP missions provide public relations opportunities 
to promote the European Union to its citizens. The 
missions have press officers and use both traditional 
and creative ways to increase their visibility. The EU 
Council  Secretariat  prints  colour  brochures  to 
promote  missions,  such  as  Proxima,  the  EU  Police 
Mission  in  the  former  Yugoslav  Republic  of 
Macedonia.
6  Some  missions,  for  example,  EULEX 
Kosovo  and  the  Aceh  Monitoring  Missions  even 
created special logos for their operations: 
                                                      
2 For a more in-depth analysis of CSDP role in identity or 
nation building in the EU, see Stephanie Anderson, Crafting 
EU Security Policy: In Pursuit of European Identity (Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner 2008). 
3 The Lisbon Treaty later changed the name of the policy to 
the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). 
4 25 March 2010 Council Draft 8029/10. 
5 Andrew Rettman, “EU commission justifies Haiti 'visibility' 
concerns” euboserver.org, 28 January 2010. 
6http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Prox
imaBrochure.pdf. EUC Working Paper No. 10 
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Others  have  created  Facebook  pages  or  made 
documentaries  for  television.
7 In Kosovo, the EULEX 
mission,  the  EU  special  representative  and  t he 
Commission  all  collaborated  on  a  public  relations 
road-show called “Come to Europe” that travelled by 
truck  to  twenty  towns  in  the  region  featuring  a 
specially  written  play,  quizzes,  music  and  local 
entertainment.
8 
Unfortunately, such efforts have had l imited success 
in  garnering  press  attention.  For  example,  the 
GoogleNews  archives  which  combs  over  25,000 
sources finds only two articles on the Kosovo road -
show.
9 A quantitative study of news coverage of CSDP 
missions shows that, in general, they get very  little 
press play. Why? Considering that visibility is one of 
the basic principles behind CSDP missions and that the 
EU devotes many resources to it, the lack of news 
coverage  could  be  interpreted  as  a  policy  failure. 
Understanding  the  reasons  behind  this   failure, 
whether it is a question of agency, that is whether the 
EU would be able to fix the problem by changing 
procedure, or whether it is structural, that is, intrinsic 
in the missions themselves, is vital to addressing the 
EU’s foreign policy goals. This paper concludes that 
the  problem  is  structural:  CSDP  missions  are  poor 
vehicles  for  EU  promotion  because  of  political, 
institutional, and logistical reasons. If these missions 
inherently cannot fulfil their visibility function, the EU 
may want to rethink whether such risky ventures are 
still worthwhile. 
The EU in Aceh: Primed for Success? A Case-Study 
into the Public Relations Side of CSDP Missions 
The Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) is an excellent 
case  through  which  to  analyse  the  public  relations 
side of CSDP missions because it was such a success. 
                                                      
7 Interview with press officer at CSDP mission who wished 
to remain anonymous on 27 February 2012. 
8 http://www.flickr.com/photos/eulex/2507978739/  
9 “Warten auf Instruktionen in Kosovo” Neue Zuericher 
Zeitung, 16 June 2008, 
http://www.nzz.ch/aktuell/startseite/warten-auf-
instruktionen-in-kosovo-1.760317  
The  mission  accomplished  its  goals  with  no  deaths, 
few embarrassments, and within the established time 
limits and budgets. Moreover, Aceh marked the EU’s 
first  foray  into  Asia,  having  been  invited  after  the 
2004  Indian  Ocean  tsunami.  The  promise  of  both 
peace  and  European  aid  brought  in  a  significant 
human dimension as well as a ready-made press corps 
that  was  already  on  the  ground  reporting  on  the 
devastation. In addition, the decommissioning of arms 
was ‘sexy’, as the subject provided good photo ops for 
journalists.  
The  2004  tsunami  provided  the  impetus  for  all 
conflicting  parties  to  work  towards  a  peace 
agreement,  whose  negotiations  were  already 
underway  between  the  Free  Aceh  Movement  or 
Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) and the government of 
Indonesia  (GoI).  The  EU  became  involved  because 
many GAM rebels, who were in exile in Finland and 
Sweden, became EU citizens. A Finnish businessman 
with  decades  of  experience  in  Indonesia,  Juha 
Christensen, became an intermediary between all the 
relevant  parties.  He  contacted  former  Finnish 
president  Martti  Ahtisaari,  to  inquire  whether  his 
group, the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), might 
be  interested  in  facilitating  the  peace  process. 
Ahtisaari, in turn, contacted EU High Representative 
for  CFSP,  Javier  Solana.
10 According  to  a  US  State 
Department  cable  released  by  Wikileaks,  “The  GoI 
suggested that ASEAN as an organization perform this 
task [the monitoring of the peace mission]. Ahtisaari 
felt  ASEAN  ‘would  not  be  credible  enough’  for  the 
GAM, but suggested that ASEAN and the EU together 
might  suffice.  He  left  this  thought  (which  he  has 
already  mentioned  to  Solana)  for  both  sides  to 
consider.”
11  Although  the  Indonesian  government 
preferred ASEAN, the GAM wanted to internationalize 
the  presence  as  much  as  possible,  and  the  GoI 
preferred the EU to the United Nations (UN) because 
of its negative experience with the UN in East Timor.
12 
Moreover, ASEAN did not have the capabilities to take 
on such as task alone. 
                                                      
10 Kirsten E. Schulze, “Mission Not So Impossible: The AMM 
and the Transition from Conflict to Peace in Aceh, 2005-
2006,” Working Paper no. 131, S. Rajaratnam School of 
International Studies, Singapore and interview with 
participant who wished to remain anonymous, 14 May 
2012, Singapore. 
11 Wikileaks US State Department Cables, 05 Helsinki 242, 
2005-02-25, 13:22, Confidential: Embassy Helsinki. 
12 Interview with Dutch official from the Permanent Mission 
of the Netherlands to the European Union, 8 November 
2005, Brussels, Belgium.  EUC Working Paper No. 10 
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The  EU  and  ASEAN  monitors  worked  in  teams 
composed  of  people  from  each  organization  to 
monitor  and  rule  on  any  violations  of  the  MoU, 
maintain  good  cooperation  among  the  parties, 
oversee  the  decommissioning  of  GAM  weapons,  as 
well as to monitor human rights and the process of 
legislative change in Aceh.  
Kirsten  Schulze  labelled  the  mission  successful 
because  of  GAM’s  and  GoI’s  commitment  to  the 
peace  process,  the  impartiality  of  the  mission,  the 
support of EU member states during setup, as well as 
the  quick  amnesty  and  the  establishment  of  the 
Commission  on  Security  Arrangements  (COSA).
13 
Regarding the monitors themselves, the officials were 
well trained, highly skilled and some had experience 
of other processes of disarmament.
14 The Head of 
Mission had excellent diplomatic and managerial skills 
as well as expertise and experience. Nearly all of the 
2000 prisoners were granted amnesty and quickly 
released.  The  decommissioning  of  GAM  weapons, 
redeployment of Indonesian military personal, and 
the  reintegration  of  former  GAM  members   into 
society, for the most part, went smoothly.
15  
One problem did come up with former GAM members 
not getting the money that was promised to them. 
Local GAM commanders said that they needed more 
money because there were more ex-combatants then 
they thought, but there were also hints of luxury cars 
and new houses.
16 Another disappointment was in the 
area of human rights. At the end of the mission, 
neither  a  human  rights  court  nor  a  truth  and 
reconciliation  commission  had  been  established. 
However, as Schulze   has argued, if the AMM had 
pushed human rights too hard in the beginning, the 
progress  the  mission  did  make  might  not  have 
happened.
17 In other words, the political sensitivity 
limited  the  mission  to  this  degree.  The  political 
sensitivity also limited the public relations side of the 
mission as well. 
                                                      
13Kirsten E. Schulze, “Mission Not So Impossible the Aceh 
monitoring and Mission and Lessons learned for the EU,” 
International Policy Analysis, http://library.fes.de/pdf-
files/id/04786.pdf pg. 1.  
14 Kirsten E. Schulze, “Aceh – AMM” in European Union 
Institute for Security Studies, European Security and 
Defence Policy: The First 10 years (1999-2009), 267. 
15 Ibid., 269-271. 
16 Ibid., 271. 
17 Ibid., 272. 
The AMM as Public Relations Tool 
After  the  French  and  the  Dutch  rejected  the 
Constitutional Treaty in May and June of 2005, the EU 
desperately  needed  damage  control  and  some 
positive PR. In the wake of the referendum defeat, 
Solana  promised  to  make  the  ESDP  the  crowning 
achievement of the EU: 
What is of crucial importance now is that we keep 
on working as we did before and that we do not 
get into a psychological paralysis. Let me assure 
you that this will undoubtedly not happen to me!  
. . . . There is no doubt that the European people 
as well as the European leaders wish the EU to 
become  an  increasingly  important  actor  in  the 
international arena.  
In the meantime, our work has to continue and we 
need to explain to our partners around the world 
that  the  EU  will  remain  an  active  global  player. 
Our partners need a strong Europe that acts with 
determination  on  the  international  stage.  Life 
continues  and  the  course  of  the  world  will  not 
stop.  The  world's  challenges  will  not  change 
because of yesterday's vote and there are many 
problems of the world that keep on challenging us. 
We as the EU have to face these problems and we 
have to keep on working on their resolution 24 
hours a day. This is what we will have to do and 
this is what I will certainly do.
18 
Solana  understood  that  successful  ESDP  missions 
could rally the public once more, and renew faith in 
the Union. Ahtisaari concurred: “I felt that this [Aceh] 
was a splendid opportunity for the EU to show it can 
succeed in such things. That, in spite of other troubles, 
there could be co-operation on foreign and security 
issues  in  the  EU.”
19  The  French  were  strong 
supporters  of  the  idea,  finding  that  the  Aceh 
“operation also sat extremely well with the whole EU 
                                                      
18 Summary of the remarks to the press by EU’s High 
Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana on the results of 
the referendum in France, Brussels, 30 May 2005, S201/05, 
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/dec
larations/84999.pdf  
19 Katri Merikallio, Making Peace: Ahtisaari and Aceh, (Juva: 
WS Bookwell Oy (WSOY), 2006): 80. See also Quentin Peel, 
“The importance to Europe of a distant war” Financial 
Times, 18 August 2005, 21. EUC Working Paper No. 10 
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security  strategy,  in  which  the  EU  sought  a  more 
weighty role worldwide.”
20 
The Media Coverage of CSDP Missions: Little Mention 
and Little Debate 
If  external  action  is  to  “bring  Europe  closer  to  the 
people”, at the minimum, the people must know that 
the EU acts overseas. Luxembourg, which held the EU 
presidency  during  the  first  half  of  2005,  made  the 
issue  of  ESDP  promotion  a  main  talking  point. 
Although lengthy, this quotation is instructive.  
To  achieve  the  goal  of  an  improved  and 
enhanced  communication  strategy,  there  is  no 
secret:  explain,  popularize,  envelop  it  in 
common language at the same time as debating 
its objectives and concepts in order to spread it 
among  the  public.  In  most  of  the  European 
societies,  where  armed  conflicts  have  a  bad 
reputation and where the horrors of war are still 
profoundly  anchored,  speaking  about  security 
and  defence  often  awakens  suspicion  and 
provokes a sense of unease which it is difficult to 
get  rid  of.  Nonetheless,  stereotypes  and 
misleading sentiments tend to stay on forever. 
Therefore,  in  order  to  convince,  the  European 
Union and the Member States have to become 
even  more  active  and  have  to  develop  a  true 
communication strategy on ESDP. The objective 
of this strategy should be to rally public opinion 
around a policy and to legitimate the ESDP by a 
strong parliamentary and popular support. [sic, 
but emphasis added].
21 
Academic research supports the claims made above: 
media  coverage,  provided  it  is  both  visible  and 
consistent, can change public opinion regarding the 
EU.
22  
In general, all the CSDP missions have been successful 
                                                      
20 Ibid., 84. 
21 Luxembourg Presidency, “Working document relating to 
point 5 of the agenda: Presidency non-paper - Promoting 
the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)” 11 
March 2005, 
http://www.eu2005.lu/en/actualites/documents_travail/20
05/03/18definfo/index.html  
22 Claes DeVreese and Hajo G. Boomgaarden, “Media 
Effects on Public Opinion about the Enlargement of the 
European Union,” Journal of Common Market Studies 44 
(2006),419. 
insofar  as  they  have  accomplished  their  goals,  had 
minimal loss of life, and cost relatively little. Certainly, 
there have been some mildly embarrassing stories, for 
example,  when  Iraqis  participating  in  EULEX  Iraq, 
brought to the Netherlands for judicial training, snuck 
out  to  seek  asylum  in  Sweden,
23 but not only have 
there  been  no  Srebrenicas,
24 there  are  almost  no 
cases of misbehaving military or civilian workers. As 
Luc Frieden, Luxembourg minister and President -in-
office of the Council explained, “European soldiers in 
the world are like our visiting card.”
 25 Therefore, the 
Council adopted standards of behaviour to be applied 
to  all  categories  of  personnel  involved  in  ESDP 
operations.  Any  violation  of  human  rights  is  to  be 
reported, and all are to respect the ethnic, religious 
and cultural diversity of the local population. Drug use 
and sexual exploitation are forbidden: “It is a code of 
conduct  so  that  EU  soldiers  are  worthy 
representatives  of  the  EU  in  difficult  missions 
throughout  the  world.”
26 This  record  is  a  significant 
accomplishment. 
Yet, the media have mostly ignored the CSDP missions. 
In  a  content  analysis,  the  author  and  her  research 
assistant  placed  the  official  names  of  every  CSDP 
mission  into  three  separate  databases:  Lexis/Nexis 
Academic  (Lexis);  World  News  Connection  (WNC), 
formerly  the  Foreign  Broadcast  Information  Service 
(FBIS); and the GoogleNews archive. Lexis/Nexis has a 
database of over 10,000 global news sources.
27 WNC, 
operated by the Open Source Center, an agency of the 
US  government,  has  thousands  of  non -US  media 
translated into English, with a particular emphasis on 
local  media  coverage.
28 GoogleNews  covers  about 
25,000 news sources worldwide.
29  
                                                      
23 Interview with Dutch official from the Permanent Mission 
of the Netherlands to the European Union, 8 November 
2005, Brussels, Belgium.  
24 The July 1995 Srebrenica massacre or genocide during 
the Bosnian war refers to the killing of 8,000 Bosniaks or 
Bosnian Muslims in an enclave designated a “safe area” 
under UN protection. The 400 Dutch peacekeepers on the 
ground were unable to prevent the massacre. 
25 “UE/Defence: Progress expected in military capabilities 
field,” Europe, 24 May 2005, 4.  
26 Ibid. 
27 http://www.lexisnexis.com/en-us/products/lexisnexis-
academic.page 
28 For more information, see 
http://wnc.fedworld.gov/description.html . 
29 Joshua Cohen, "Same Protocol, More Options for News 
Publishers". Google News Blog. December 2, 2009, "There EUC Working Paper No. 10 
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Due to language barriers, this research project only 
utilized articles in English or translated into English. 
Both  Lexis  and  WNC  databases  have  extensive 
archives  of  English-language  articles,  translated  and 
otherwise. Despite this limitation, the search yielded 
thousands  of  newspaper  articles,  press  releases, 
broadcast transcripts, and various opinion pieces from 
news sources around the world. In order to ensure 
the  analysis  of  only  relevant  articles,  all  missions 
search terms included only the official mission name 
(e.g.  EULEX  Kosovo,  EUFOR  Congo)  and  date 
restrictions when necessary (e.g. the multiple EUPOL 
missions in Congo). We looked for the specific terms 
throughout the article, as opposed to searching within 
the  headline  and  lead,  in  order  to  count  as  many 
relevant  results  as  possible.  The  content  analysis 
necessarily  excluded  press  selections,  governmental 
journals and reports, and industry reports due to time 
constraints  and  relevance  to  search  terms  and 
parameters. 
Such a large volume of articles necessitated the use of 
random  sampling  for  the  various  missions.  The 
analytical  criteria  for  missions  with  a  high  volume 
(over  150)  of  articles  called  for  a  sampling  of  100 
articles, regardless of the sample size. The criteria also 
stressed the need to randomly select articles based on 
a logical, linear basis. For example, the EUFOR Althea 
mission in the WNC search yielded 266 hits, so every 
second article comprised the random sample for the 
content analysis (articles 2, 4, 6, etc.). Missions with 
fewer than 150 hits necessitated a content analysis of 
all available articles so as to ensure the best possible 
outcome  for  statistical  analysis.  Since  there  is  no 
feasible  way  to  exclude  the  irrelevant  types  of 
publications  within  the  search  parameters  in  the 
respective search engines, whenever press selections 
or other similarly excluded types of articles appeared 
in the results, the next possible relevant article was 
analyzed  and  the  pattern  of  randomly  selecting 
articles resumed at the predetermined intervals. 
Slight  differences  in  the  two  search  engines 
necessitated  slightly  different  search  methods  on 
occasion. For example, the WNC database only goes 
back ten years, thus explaining the lack of articles for 
the  ECMM/EUMM,  the  Balkans  monitoring  mission. 
Furthermore, Lexis allowed for sorting of the articles 
by date, starting with the earliest available date. WNC 
sorted  articles  by  date  but  only  allowed  for sorting 
                                                                                          
are more than 25,000 publishers from around the world in 
Google News today." 
starting  with  the  latest  date.  While  not  ideal,  the 
content analysis of the WNC articles for each mission 
began with the most recent articles and progressed to 
the earliest. Analysis from Lexis sources began with 
the  earliest  possible  articles  and  progressed  from 
there. With regard to Lexis/Nexis, we did not specify a 
region so as to cast the net as wide as possible. We 
chose to search for the words as natural language.  
Coding for each article consisted of eleven different 
variables:  date,  official  mission  name,  perspective, 
coverage tone, country of origin for the publication, 
length of the article (number of sentences), length of 
the  actual  coverage  on  the  mission  (number  of 
sentences), word count, search engine utilized, article 
type (news, analysis, opinion, or press release), and 
publication.  WNC  searches  included  inflated  word 
counts due to the presence of reprinted leads, and 
expansive tags and search terms. In order to remain 
consistent, all numbers for the word count variable 
are  reproduced  as  given  by  the  respective  search 
engines.  Identifying  information  present  in  each 
article  allowed  for  straightforward  coding  for  other 
variables (date, country of origin, length of articles, 
length  on  action,  search  engine,  and  publications). 
The  researcher manually counted  the  sentences  for 
the length of the article and length on the action. 
The  variables  of  coverage  tone,  article  type,  and 
perspective required strict coding criteria due to the 
subjective nature of the variables. Coverage tone of 
the  articles  consisted  of  either  positive  or  negative 
coding. Positive articles reported on the progress of 
the  respective  missions,  analysed  the  process  and 
outcomes  of  the  missions,  or  characterized  the 
missions  in  any  sort  of  positive  or  neutral  way. 
Negative articles focused almost entirely on mission 
setbacks. Mission deaths, local population casualties 
due  to  the mission  presence, serious  administrative 
obstacles  (on  the  EU,  international,  and  national 
levels),  and/or  tactical  and  strategic  obstacles  were 
the indicators for negative coverage tone. The strict 
criteria for coding articles as negative were necessary 
in  order  to  properly  classify  articles  in  the  instance 
where the majority of the coverage remained positive 
or neutral. 
Article  type  consisted  of  four  categories:  news, 
analysis, opinion, and press releases. In most cases, 
the identifying information in the article identified the 
proper  article  type.  When  the  publisher  or  search 
engine  failed  to  provide the  information within  the 
article, a thorough reading of the articles coupled with EUC Working Paper No. 10 
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comparison  to  previously  categorized  articles 
provided  sufficient  information  to  determine  the 
correct article type. 
Perspective  of  the  article  proved  to  be  the  most 
difficult  to  code.  Perspective  consisted  of  three 
different  categories:  national,  international,  or 
European.  Due  to  perspective  overlap,  in  particular 
between the European and international perspectives, 
the analytical criteria needed to be thorough. For an 
article to be considered European in perspective, the 
majority  of  the  article  had  to  report  on  the 
significance  of  the  mission  with  regard  to  the  EU, 
issues regarding European coordination and decision-
making, or states’ role both with and within the EU or 
Europe as  a  whole.  For  an  article  to  be  considered 
international  in  perspective,  the  article  needed  to 
cover  the  larger  geopolitical  ramifications  of  the 
respective missions (namely with regard to the UN, 
NATO, or other international organizations; also, the 
larger realms of international or regional security), or 
relations  of  the  country  in  which  the  mission  was 
taking  place  with  the  number  of  applicable 
international institutions or states. For an article to be 
considered  national  in  perspective,  it  needed 
primarily to cover individual states’ experiences with 
the missions,  namely  in  the  form of  budgetary  and 
operational  concerns  and  progress.  Undoubtedly, 
some  articles  could  be  classified  as  international  or 
European,  or  national  or  European,  but  the  criteria 
served to eliminate as much ambiguity as possible. 
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In raw figures, the CSDP missions got very little play in 
traditional media outlets such as newspapers, radio, 
and television. Of all the missions, only EULEX Kosovo 
had  a  hit  number  in  the  thousands  in  all  three 
databases. Only eight missions out of 26 had hits in 
the hundreds in all three databases. Most comparable 
missions in NATO received similar numbers with the 
exception  of  the  major  military  intervention  in 
Afghanistan  that  numbered  in  the  thousands  in  all 
three  databases,  and  had  numbers  in  five  or  six 
figures. 
The Aceh mission’s coverage was about average, but 
still poor over all. As one of the reporters in Indonesia 
put it, “the AMM mission was small part in the big 
picture of post-tsunami recovery operations in Aceh”. 
While the mission itself received 935 hits in Google 
News,  the  words  “Aceh”  and  “tsunami”  together 
receive 38,400 hits.  
With  regard  to  the  Aceh  mission  in  particular,  the 
content  analysis  shows  that  from  the  Lexis/Nexis 
database,  18  per  cent  of  articles  were  EU  member 
states, 53 per cent were from Indonesia, six per cent 
from Thailand, five per cent from Malaysia, three per 
cent from Thailand, and the rest were from the US, 
Australia, and China. In the great majority of cases, 
the articles were from wire services such as Antara, 
Associated Press, Agence France Presse, and Xinhua 
General  News  Service.  The  only  newspaper  with 
significant coverage of the mission was  The Jakarta 
Post.  Within  the  Lexis  data  set,  99  per  cent  of  the 
coverage was positive, and 88 per cent was news as 
opposed  to  editorial,  analysis  or  press  release. 
However, the coverage itself was fairly brief: 39 per 
cent of the articles were under 300 words; only four 
per cent was over 1,000 words. A little over a third of 
the  articles  (37  per  cent)  had  ten  or  more  lines 
devoted to covering the actual mission. 
From the World News Connection dataset, 37.7 per 
cent of the articles were from EU countries, 51 per 
cent  were  from  Indonesia,  and  one  per  cent  from 
other  ASEAN  countries.  The  rest  was  from  other 
countries.  The  articles,  like  the  Lexis  dataset,  were 
mostly  positive:  97  per  cent.  Three  per  cent  was 
analysis; the rest was news. In terms of length, the 
coverage was a bit more in depth than in the Lexis 
dataset: 53.6 per cent was over 500 words, but only 2 
articles were over 1000. 45 per cent had ten or more 
lines on the mission itself. The majority of coverage 
came  from  two  Indonesian  journals,  Kompas
30 and 
The Jakarta Post. 
Considering  that  ASEAN  was  a  co-sponsor  of  the 
mission, that it provided nearly half the monitors, and 
that the Deputy Head of Mission was Thai, the author 
found it astonishing that the Lexis/Nexis and World 
News  Connection  uncovered  next  to  no  articles 
published in English in ASEAN countries. To spread the 
net as wide as possible, she used two different search 
phrases: “Aceh AMM” and “Aceh Monitoring Mission”, 
and also looked up the main English journals. A search 
for  merely  “Aceh”  or  the  words  without  quotation 
marks resulted in articles on the region, but not on 
the mission itself. The  Bangkok Post (Thailand), the 
Manila Times (Philippines), the Daily Inquirer (Manila, 
Philippines) and The New Light of Myanmar (Rangoon, 
Burma)  had  no  coverage  whatsoever.  The  Nation 
                                                      
30 A translation of Kompas articles was included in the 
World News Connection database. 
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(Bangkok, Thailand) had one article, but it was an op-
ed piece written by a Thai Senator.
 31 The New Straits 
Times  (Malaysia)  had  a  total  of  eight  articles,  but 
three were written by Solana, and the rest were on 
the  peace  process  in  general  with  little  mention  of 
mission.  The  Straits  Times  of  Singapore  had  nine 
articles,  but,  as  in  Malaysia,  three  were  written  by 
Solana,  one  by  the  Commissioner  for  External 
Relations, one from the UK High Commissioner, and 
the rest, like the New Straits Times, are on the peace 
process in general with little mention of mission.
32 
The “ASEAN way” – the premise of non-interference 
in internal affairs of other member states mean that 
ASEAN nations speak to each other informally rather 
than criticize each other or even discuss matters in 
public. Considering the sensitive nature of the peace 
agreement  between  the  Government  of  Indonesia 
and the GAM, one can surmise that the governments 
and press of the ASEAN countries most likely chose to 
turn a blind eye to the mission. Even praise of the 
mission  might  sound  like  an  endorsement  of  EU 
interference  in  the  region  and  a  tacit  criticism  of 
Jakarta. Jakarta was also paying for the per diems of 
the ASEAN monitors.
33 
Outside  Southeast  Asia,  the  Far  Eastern  Economic 
Review,  a  Hong  Kong  based  Asian  weekly  with  an 
international audience had no coverage of the story. 
The  South  China  Morning  Post,  also  based  in  Hong 
Kong but widely read in Southeast Asia published only 
four stories on the subject.
34  
 
                                                      
31 The Bangkok Post was searched twice, once with 
Lexis/Nexis and a second time with the Post’s own search 
engine. The Manila Times was searched with ProQuest; its 
archive began the same day as the mission: 15 September 
2005. The author also used ProQuest to search the Daily 
Inquirer’s archives, but in this case, the archives for the 
Philippine newspaper began a few months after the onset 
of the mission on 1 January 2006. To search The New Light 
of Myanmar archives, the author used World News 
Connection, but their records only went back to December 
2005. The Nation was searched using Asianet. 
32 The author searched both the New Straits Times and the 
Straits Times archives using Lexis/Nexis. 
33 Merikallio, 162. 
34 The author used ProQuest to search the archives of the 
Far Eastern Economic Review, which although no longer in 
print, was in print during the time of the Aceh Monitoring 
Mission. The South China Morning Post was searched with 
Lexis/Nexis. 
Overall, considering the success of the mission, media 
coverage was limited. 
Why CSDP Missions are Poor Vehicles for EU 
Promotion  
CSDP  missions  are  poor  vehicles  for  EU  promotion 
because  the  very  nature  of  CSDP  missions  hinders 
press coverage for political, institutional, and logistical 
reasons. In other words, CSDP missions are politically 
sensitive, making news coverage imprudent or even, 
impossible. They can stymie the press officers who are 
hostage to the bureaucracy and their very locations 
make it difficult for journalists to cover, even when a 
crisis management mission is successful. 
The fact that CSDP missions are the product of secret, 
multilateral  negotiations  dealing  with  politically 
sensitive crises means that the very construction of 
press releases and statements is fraught with danger 
as the wrong word could jeopardize the mission itself. 
First, they often begin as secret negotiations among 
diplomats behind closed doors. Therefore, there can 
be no build up in the press. Moreover, peace building 
is more likely to succeed if the facilitator has a low 
profile.  The  protagonists  will  be  more  likely  to 
participate in a conference if they get the credit for 
the  peace  agreement  rather  than  the  EU  or  other 
international  organization,  non-governmental 
organization  or  other  intermediary.  In  other  words, 
EU promotion could endanger the mission. 
Institutionally,  once  the  situation  is  brought  to  the 
attention  of  EU  member  states,  new  closed-door 
negotiations  begin  to  win  the  necessary  support  of 
the  27  of  them.  With  unanimity  the  standard, 
agreement  can  be  time  consuming.  Moreover, 
agreement does not mean that costs are shared: all 
CSDP missions are de facto coalitions of those willing 
to give donations and volunteers. To solidify support, 
the  missions  are  often  done  on  the  cheap;  PR  is 
seldom  a  priority.  Details,  including  the  master 
messages are hammered out among the ambassadors 
of the Political and Security Committee (PSC). These 
lowest  common  denominator  agreements  result  in 
officious,  pre-fabricated  news  bites  that  do  not 
publish well.  
Logistically,  it  is  expensive  and  dangerous  for 
international  and  European  journalists  to  cover  the 
missions as they are, by definition, in the middle of a 
crisis and are often quite remote. The local press is EUC Working Paper No. 10 
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usually not very active because the crisis has curtailed 
its  freedom,  or  because  it  was  not  very  well 
developed in the first place, or both. In addition, the 
Brussels-based press officer may not speak the local 
language  making  interaction  with  local  journalists 
difficult.  
Finally,  there  are  practicalities  involved  with  each 
mission  that  minimize  a  mission’s  promotional 
capability.  For  example,  in  the  Aceh  Monitoring 
Mission,  the  EU  press  officer  became  the  ‘official’ 
historian of the mission requiring perfect impartiality 
rather than EU promotion. In military missions, much 
of  what  goes  on  is  secret;  the  military  seldom 
broadcasts its strategy. In an executive mission such 
as  EULEX  Kosovo,  more  coverage  is  negative,  in 
reaction to the rulings.
35  
The Aceh Monitoring Mission suffered from all these 
problems. Although it succeeded in bringing peace to 
the  region,  sadly,  the  mission  received  very  little 
attention from the world.  
Secrecy + Low Profile = Poor Public Relations 
Opportunities 
Katri Merikallio describes in her book Making Peace: 
Ahtisaari and Aceh the origins of the EU-ASEAN Aceh 
Monitoring  Mission.  Peace  had  been  elusive  for 
decades, but a chance encounter with Finnish national 
Juha  Christensen  put  the  settlement  on  track. 
Christensen  and  his  wife  received  posts  as 
international language researchers sent to Sulawesi, 
an island in Indonesia, with the goal of charting the 
over 100 regional languages. In doing so, he learned 
Bahasa  Indonesia  fluently  and  made  life-long 
friendships.  
In the late 1990s, he became interested in Aceh, and, 
as  luck  would  have  it,  met  Farid  Husain,  Deputy 
Minister for Social Affairs. Husain was known for his 
role in settling earlier crises on other islands, and in a 
subsequent  meeting  in  2003,  Christensen  told  him 
that  he  had  contacts  with  the  GAM,  the  Acehnese 
rebel group in Stockholm. In this discussion, former 
Finnish  President  Martti  Ahtisaari’s  name  was  first 
                                                      
35 EULEX Kosovo has some of the most negative press 
coverage, most likely because of executive nature of the 
mission, handing out rulings that may be unpopular, and 
because several EU member states, Romania, Spain, 
Slovakia, Greece, and Cyprus, do not recognize Kosovo 
independence. 
raised as a possible mediator. What Christensen did 
not  know  was  that  Jusuf  Kalla,  Indonesia’s  Vice 
President, had charged Husain with the secret task of 
making  new  contacts  with  the  GAM  leadership  in 
Sweden. The Government of Indonesia was open to 
peace negotiations, but with stories of human rights 
abuses and a legacy of failed talks, it did not want to 
make  its  overtures  public.
36  The  issue  was  too 
politically sensitive. 
The political sensitivity meant that the negotiations 
required  secrecy. Merikallio  has  several  photos of 
members of the GAM and the GoI standing in the 
snow,  in  January  2005,  while  partaking  in  closed 
negotiations at the Koeningstedt Manor in Vantaa,  
Finland.  When  asked  why  the  talks  took  place  in 
Finland,  Ahtisaari  answered,  “It  was  necessary  that 
the parties be isolated from the press.” He explained 
the situation as mutually exclusive: “Both mediation 
team and parties had a choice – be nice to the press 
or  work  to  try  to  solve  real  problems  and  find  an 
agreement.
 37 Only Ahtisaari spoke to the press, and 
only to say that the two sides were meeting. Ahtisaari 
explained: “There is always a great temptation for the 
parties to use the media in the negotiations. But if we 
start  to  announce  via  the  media  that  we  have 
demanded this or that of the other party, finding a 
solution will become ever more difficult.”
38  
It was at this time that the EU was raised as a possible 
monitor for any peace agreement. The fact that the 
exiled  GAM  leaders  were  also  naturalized  Swedish 
citizens made the EU involved. Yet, these negotiations 
had to occur behind closed doors; they could not have 
succeeded in the public eye. Therefore, there could be 
no build up in the press of the EU’s involvement in the 
mission. Any possibility of EU promotion was lost. 
Keeping a low profile was conducive to a successful 
operation. Such was the lesson learned in the Council 
document of 2008 that drew on the Aceh experience. 
Recognizing  the  sensitive  political  environment  and 
that  the  “mere  deployment  of  such  missions  can 
sometimes  trigger  political  reactions  and/or  create 
expectations”,  crisis  missions  must  be  planned  in  a 
confidential manner, to the point that transparency 
                                                      
36 Merikallio, 28-9. 
37 “Delivering Peace for Aceh: An Interview with President 
Marti Ahtisaari” in Aguswandi and Judith 
Large. “Reconfiguring Politics: The Indonesia-Aceh Peace 
Process.” Accord 20 (2008), 23. 
38 Merikallio, 22. EUC Working Paper No. 10 
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“may  have  to  be  sacrificed,  at  least  in  the  early 
stages.”
39 Using  CSDP  missions  to  promote  the  EU 
could  very  well  compromise  the  success  of  the 
missions themselves; the EU cannot be seen to take 
too much credit for the peace process. As Ahtisaari 
explained, “That is why I always praise the parties for 
the  fact  that  this  is  an  agreement  between  them. 
Nobody  wants  to  be  reminded  afterwards  that  an 
outsider was  needed  to take  care  of  their  affairs. I 
learned that already in Namibia.”
40  
The Problems of Intergovernmentalism: Secrecy, 
Diplomacy, and Bureaucracy 
All CSDP missions are politically sensitive by definition, 
if for no other reason than that all the EU member 
states have different national interests. The Treaty on 
European Union sets out very clear decision making 
procedures  with  the  perhaps  contradictory  goal  of 
speaking  with  a  common  voice  on  international 
events, while at the same time not forcing a national 
capital’s  hand.  As  a  result,  all  foreign  and  security 
policy decision making is characterized by diplomatic 
negotiations behind closed doors guided by specific 
processes to ensure no government will be publicly 
embarrassed or put under public pressure to change 
its policy. The press is not allowed in. Instead, once a 
decision is made, the PSC negotiates the wording of a 
press release to make sure all the nuances carefully 
wrought  from  the  closed-door  deliberations  are 
properly conveyed in the media.  
The EU has a common foreign and security policy, not 
a single policy. Much more than a semantic difference, 
the word ‘common’ denotes 27 separate, yet aligned 
policies, as opposed to a single EU policy. The trick to 
finding  a  common  policy  is  pinpointing  the  lowest 
common denominator among the 27 states. Both the 
Treaty of Nice, which governed the Aceh mission, and 
the  Lisbon  Treaty  in  force  today,  have  strong 
bureaucratic mechanisms to assure that no national 
government  is  forced  to  do  anything  against  its 
national interest: “The common foreign and security 
policy is subject to specific rules and procedures. It 
shall be defined and implemented by the European 
Council and the Council acting unanimously”.
41 
                                                      
39 Council 10114/08, 11-12. 
40 Merikillion, 141. 
41 Lisbon Treaty on European Union, article 24.1. In 2005, 
the CFSP was placed in its own pillar and governed by 
intergovernmentalism and unanimity away from the 
All CFSP statements and decisions are the product of 
deliberative, bureaucratic procedures, with the rather 
tame goal of “the achievement of an ever-increasing 
degree of  convergence  of  Member  State  actions.”
42 
Nevertheless,  any  member  state  government  may 
opt-out by abstaining from a vote.
43 Moreover, a state 
has a  de facto veto if it declares that the proposed 
action  is  against  vital,  national  interests.
44 Finally, 
even if a state votes in favour of a mission, there is no 
requirement that a member state contribute to the 
mission, either financially or with personnel.  
With regard to the Aceh mission, although this was an 
EU mission, in fact, not all member states contributed, 
and two non-EU states, Norway and Switzerland, did. 
The CSDP is a shell for donated national capabilities. 
To date, there is no CSDP mission in which every EU 
member state participated. In each case, the hat must 
be passed around asking for donations and volunteers. 
Member  state  governments  prefer 
intergovernmentalism in EU foreign policy because 
the national capitals are held responsible for foreign 
policy, especially when their citizens attached to these 
missions  are risking their lives . When Ahtisaari first 
contacted Solana about the Aceh mission, “I told him 
about the negotiations and said that I had been taking 
up the name of the EU in this context. He said to go 
ahead but that you know, of course, that it is not me 
but  the  member  countries  that  decide  on  these 
things.”
45 
Secrecy and the Mission 
The secrecy required in negotiating the Memorandum 
of  Understanding  (MoU)  between  the  GoI  and  the 
GAM stymied the planning of the monitoring mission 
itself. In other words, the MoU set out the role of the 
EU without consulting with the EU itself: “This created 
problems when [the] EU had to define the mandate of 
its mission in its planning documents, especially with 
                                                                                          
Community method of pillar I and any oversight by the 
Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of 
Justice. After the Lisbon treaty, unanimity still governs CFSP 
decision making, but the treaty introduced certain 
situations where qualified majority voting QMV) could take 
place. Despite these inclusions, the culture of the Council 
has always been that of unanimity in all areas of policy 
whether agriculture or foreign policy, QMV seldom occurs. 
42 Lisbon Treaty, article 24.2. 
43 Ibid., article 31. 
44 Ibid., article 31.2. 
45 Merikallio, 80. EUC Working Paper No. 10 
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regards to the monitoring of human rights.”
46 In the 
end, EU officials were not allowed to read the terms 
of the agreement until officially signed on 15 August 
2005, the start date of the mission.
47 
Understandably, some in the Political and Security 
Committee (PSC) were skeptical of the ‘fait accompli’ 
presented  by  Ahtisaari  and  Solana,  whose  MoU 
committing  the  EU  to  action  was  secret.  The 
deliberation  in  Finland  led  to  more  closed  door 
negotiations  within  the  EU.  One  PSC  ambassador 
asked numerous questions because he “had to make 
sure  that  there  was  a  willingness  to  have  them 
there.”
48 Many member states were reluctant to get 
involved as they saw Indonesia as too far afield, and 
not  in  their  general  interest.  Solana  disagreed 
believing the mission to be tailor-made, and put all his 
weight  behind  it.  Considering  that  the  High 
Representative had 25 bosses, “you can’t talk about 
leadership,  because  then  you  are  lost.  Rather,  you 
have to be very pragmatic and show the route to take. 
It’s  the  only  way.”
49 The  French  like  this  strategy: 
“Solana pushed for Aceh. It’s his personality and his 
job.  Solana  is  the  mid-wife  for  the  EU.”
50 To  quote 
another PSC diplomat who was convinced, “We can 
go from Balkans, to Aceh, to the Middle East. It shows 
flexibility. The only limit is lack of money. Now that we 
have the ambition, we want to use the instruments 
and  to  do  something  credible.”
51 As  another  PSC 
diplomat described it: “There was opposition in the 
beginning.  The  General  Secretariat  railroaded  the 
Member States to accept? Yes, there is some truth in 
that.  Solana  and  Ahtassari  wanted  the  mission  and 
put the PSC under pressure. It was hard to say no. … 
                                                      
46 Council of the European Union, “Draft Review of 
Recommendations for Enhancing Co-operation with Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Civil Society 
Organisations (CSOs) in the Framework of EU Civilian Crisis 
Management and Conflict Prevention”, 10114/08, 29 May 
2008, 5-6. 
47 Pierre-Antoine Braud and Giovanni Grevi, “The EU 
Mission in Aceh: Implementing Peace” Occasional Paper no. 
61, European Institute for Security Studies, Paris, December 
2005, 21. 
48 Interview with PSC ambassador, 9 November 2005, 
Brussels, Belgium.  
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 French diplomat, interviewed 9 November 2005, 
Brussels, Belgium. 
51 Polish Foreign Ministry official, interviewed 8 November 
2005, Brussels, Belgium. 
In conclusion, yes, railroaded, but all’s well that ends 
well.”
52  
No  member  state  vetoed  the  mission,  but  not  all 
member states supported the mission with personnel 
and resources either. That is why the PSC negotiations 
are confidential and held behind closed doors, so as to 
give the impression of unity and not to embarrass any 
member  state  or  bring  undue  public  pressure  on 
national  governments  to  contribute.  Therefore,  no 
press is allowed, resulting in no press coverage. In any 
case,  regarding  Aceh,  the  press  would  only  have 
reported the lack of consensus over how to fund the 
mission. 
Public Relations: Lack of Funds and Lack of Personnel 
In  the  case  of  Aceh,  although  the  PSC  ultimately 
approved the mission, finding funding and personnel 
was  difficult.  In  hopes  of  gaining  political  influence 
over the operation, the Commission offered to fund 
the mission. The Council’s legal service opposed the 
offer  concerned  that  it  might  set  a  precedent 
“allowing the Commission to implement actions in the 
domain of ESDP and leading over time to the loss of 
national  control  over  civilian  crisis  management.”
53 
However,  the  CFSP  budget  did  not  have enough  to 
fully finance the mission.
54 
In the end, Solana intervened assertively to force the 
member  states’  hands.  The  Commission  plan  was 
abandoned,  the money would  come  from  the  CFSP 
budget,  and  member  states  that  were  “willing  and 
able”  would  cover  the  costs  where  they  fell,  and 
generous  donations  from  two  participating  non-EU 
member  states  –  Switzerland  and  Norway,  would 
make up the difference. The mission comprised 125 
EU  and  93  ASEAN  personnel.  Twelve  EU  countries 
contributed:  Austria,  Belgium,  Denmark,  Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, 
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The EU paid 
for operational costs and the per diems for its own 
monitors. The government of Indonesia paid the per 
diems  of  the  ASEAN  monitors,  however,  ASEAN 
member states paid the salaries of their monitors, as 
did the EU member states. Sweden provided logistics 
for  the  mission.  Five  out  of  ten  ASEAN  members 
                                                      
52 Interview with Dutch official from the Permanent Mission 
of the Netherlands to the European Union, 8 November 
2005, Brussels, Belgium.  
53 Grevi, 26. 
54 Ibid. EUC Working Paper No. 10 
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contributed:  Thailand,  Malaysia,  Brunei,  Philippines, 
and  Singapore.  Dutchman  Pieter  Feith  was  Head  of 
Mission with a budget of 15 million euros.
55  
The PSC was able to complete the decision -making 
process in six weeks, the fastest ever. Nevertheless, 
“progress on the ground quickly outpaced laborious 
negotiations  in  Brussels,  somewhat  pre-empting 
them.”
56 Timing was an issue. The peace agreement 
was signed on 15 August 2005, but at this point, most 
of Brussels was away on summer holidays. Therefore, 
official decisions could only be made in the middle of 
September,  and,  without  an  official  decision,  there 
was no funding. Finland and the UK, which held the 
Council  presidency  at  the  time,  sent  a  provisional 
team to Aceh to safeguard the peace process, but in 
doing so, the team was forced to pay its own way until 
an  official  budget  was  passed  and  they  could  be 
reimbursed.
57 
In  her  work  on  European  public  diplomacy,  Mai’a 
David-Cross argued that member states are to blame 
for  the  low  level  of  EU  foreign  policy  exposure 
“because  national-level  public  diplomacy  rarely 
includes the EU in its messages to foreign publics.”
58 
This is the case because with regard to CSDP missions, 
member states bear almost all the risks, and so take 
the lion’s share of the ‘profits’, that is the credit when 
a  mission  is  successful.  Most  missions  have  a  lead 
country, and that lead country will often coordinate 
press coverage at home using the government’s large 
and  sophisticated  press  office.  In  contrast,  CSDP 
missions  must  manage  with  very  few  people. 
Significantly, since the first CSDP mission, the number 
of press officers, even today, has never exceeded four 
people.  
Initially, there was no funding for press relations. In 
2003, a few months into the first CSDP mission, EUPM 
Bosnia,  the  police  mission,  a  German  journalist 
knocked on the door of the headquarters and asked 
to speak with the press officer. When told the mission 
had  none,  the  journalist  volunteered  and  took  the 
                                                      
55 See AMM factsheet and Merikallio, 162. 
56 Grevi, 22. 
57 Grevi 
58 Dr. Mai’a K. Davis Cross, “EU Public Diplomacy: A 
Coherent Message?” Paper delivered at the Annual 
Meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, 
Canada, 2011. 
post.
59 It would be another four years until there was 
audio-visual for Council missions.
60 Traditionally, the 
Council  secretariat  had  no  communication  budget 
because there was no need: the member states each 
had their own press team, and the Council did not 
implement policy like the Commission or debate it like 
the  Parliament.  However,  Solana  recognized  that 
alongside the greater responsibility of running CSDP 
missions  came  the  responsibility  of explaining  the 
missions to the public. Nevertheless, getting a line 
item  for  communi cation  in  the  budget  was 
problematic.  PRINCE  funding  was  for  Commission 
projects; member states already had their own teams. 
Solana’s  press  team  was  composed  of  one 
spokesperson and three officers, a total of four people. 
Solana  found  a  way  to  build  in  a  communications 
budget into each joint action, alongside funding for 
transportation  and  supplies.  When  asking  member 
states  for  personnel,  some  states  would  volunteer 
press officers, usually for a total of three. These three 
people would have no previous knowledge of either 
each  other  or  the  mission,  and  would  have  to  be 
trained by Solana’s press team in Brussels.
61 
With so little funds public relations was mostly an 
afterthought. The Council sent just one press officer 
to Aceh. Not only did he have to put all his costs, flight, 
hotel, etc., on his personal credit card until the official 
agreement and budget could be signed, but once he 
arrived, there was no office, and proper facilities. In 
the beginning, the EU subsisted on a shared computer 
and photocopier, and on the local World Bank office 
to check email.
 62  
Luckily for the mission, there was more press interest 
than  initially  expected  because  the  tsunami  had 
brought many reporters to Indonesia. While reporting 
on  the  recovery  and  rebuilding  efforts,  many 
journalists found out about the peace agreement and 
wanted to cover it at the same time. To augment the 
press office of the mission, Germany sent a diplomat 
from its Jakarta embassy, and Great Britain sent an 
Indonesian who worked at the UK embassy adding to 
a  total  of  three  people.  However,  the  German 
diplomat returned to his normal duties after several 
weeks,  and  it  was  only  the  Brussels-based  press 
                                                      
59 External Action Service official, 6 October 2011, Brussels, 
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officer and UK-loaned Indonesian spokesperson that 
covered  the  rest  of  the  time.  Although  a  major 
mission,  the  press  team  was  small,  and  had  no 
experience  working  together.  In  spite  of  the 
circumstances,  they  did  their  job  very  well,  but 
certainly could have been more effective with more 
support from Brussels.  
Risk Management in a Delicate News Environment 
As  Desmond  Dinan  once  commented,  the  member 
states'  response  to  international  events  has  been 
“uninspiring  and  banal.  The  rhetoric  of  EPC  is 
crammed  with  clichés:  elections  should  always  be 
"free and fair" … and peace should always be based 
on "sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity.”
63 Little 
has  changed  in  twenty  years.  Ashton  states  that 
Russia should hold “free and fair” elections,
64 and that 
the EU is committed to “the unity and sovereignty of 
Mali.”
65 The  contexts  may  change,  but  the  words 
remain  constant:  they  represent  the  approved 
language of European compromise. When translated 
into 23 languages, the message ossifies even further. 
Most importantly, the journalists cannot wait for the 
EU to negotiate a position: “Events in the Arab world 
may be moving with dizzying speed, but the job of 
building a European Union foreign policy will continue 
to travel at its own, glacial pace.”
66 If journalists need 
to wait for a position before they can report it, or if 
turned away because there is “no news” as of yet, 
they  will  not  spend  their  time,  money  and  effort 
reporting on EU affairs.  
The  slow,  cautious,  and  stilted  statements  are  the 
product of risk management. One of the main jobs of 
the  strategic  communication  unit  of  the  EEAS,  or 
                                                      
63Desmond Dinan, "European Political Cooperation", The 
State of the European Community: Policies, Institutions, and 
Debates in the Transitions Years Leon Hurwitz and Chritian 
Lequesne (eds.) (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Press, 1991), 
p. 403. 
64 Speech of High Representative Catherine Ashton on the 
situation in Russia to the European Parliament, Brussels, 01 
February 2012, A 36/12. 
65 Catherine Ashton EU High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the 
European Commission Speech on the situation in Mali 
European Parliament Strasbourg, 17 April 2012, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=
SPEECH/12/271 . 
66 Stephen Castle “Lady in Waiting” Foreign Policy, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/31/lady_in
_waiting 
StratCom, is coordinating the EU’s message so that all 
entities are reading from the same page regarding the 
EU  position.  The  former  RIC  –  RELEX  Information 
Committee  has  been  changed  to  the  External 
Relations Communications Committee. It coordinates 
the  communication  for  all  groups,  including  the 
member  states.  In  turn,  the  small,  three-person 
StratCom unit keeps the EU delegations/embassies all 
over  the  world  to  a  common  position  on  as  many 
issues  as  possible.  If  these  delegations  are  asked  a 
question  not  addressed  by  the  handbook  or  the 
common  position,  the  delegation  is  to  seek  out  an 
approved  answer  from  Brussels.  Heads  of  mission, 
ambassadors,  and  commission  officials  are  not 
allowed to speak to journalists without prior approval. 
The  PSC  negotiates  “master  messages”  for  civilian 
missions originally drafted by the Civilian Planning and 
Conduct  Capability  (CPCC),  and  “communication 
strategies”  for  military  missions  drafted  by  the  EU 
military  staff  (EUMS),  to  be  approved  by  all  the 
member  states  in  order  to  guide  press  officers  in 
Brussels  and  on  the  ground  when  dealing  with 
journalists. As one member of StratCom explained, it 
is not about putting words in people’s mouths, but 
“about getting the facts right.”
67 
The main goal of StratCom is message control to avert 
risk  of  embarrassment.  EU  leaders  cannot  be 
embarrassed. Member state governments cannot be 
embarrassed. EU positions are the result of lengthy 
and behind-the-scenes diplomatic negotiations. As a 
result, the EEAS employs a one-way communication 
strategy  that  requires  pre-approval  before 
information  is  released.  The  situation  is  so  dire,  it 
sometimes seems comical: at the bottom of every EU 
Security  and  Defence  newsletter  that  the  EEAS 
publishes on a weekly basis, is the disclaimer: “The 
views expressed are not to be taken in any way to 
represent  the  official  position  of  the  European 
External Action Service.” 
Despite the fact that member states and EU leaders 
wanted to promote the CSDP missions, other needs 
and  wants  were  more  important.  As  several  EU 
officials noted, member state leaders sought positive 
press for their governments back home in order to 
win  the  next  election.
68 They  also  sought  to  save 
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68 Almost every EU official I interviewed volunteered this 
assessment. Interview with EU official I, 3 October 2011, 
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money on CSDP missions whose costs had to be borne 
through  extra  funding  mechanisms.  These  actions 
have repercussions. According to two journalists, the 
EU’s desire to avoid risk and embarrassment in the 
form of ‘bad’ press leads to unidirectional information 
streams  that  stilt  the  communication  and  even 
alienate the press.
69 Whether the causality is correct 
or  not,  according  to  the  I nternational  Press 
Association,  or  API,  the  number  of  accredited 
reporters covering the EU has declined by more than 
one-third  since  2005.
70 According  to  the  European 
Commission, the number of media outlets – television 
or  radio  stations  or  newspapers  or  magazines, 
represented  has  declined  as  well.
71 The result is an 
overall reduction in news coverage of the EU. 
As one EEAS official explained, when he began at 
NATO, there were fifty press officers and two lawyers. 
Later,  when  he  moved  to  the  Council  secretari at 
under Solana, he was struck that there were only two 
press officers and fifty lawyers. He used this example 
to demonstrate how the EU is much more concerned 
with risk aversion than self-promotion.
72  
Nor  was  Javier  Solana  universally  loved  for  his 
promotion of CSDP missions, sometimes viewed as 
self-promotion.  In  2007,  the  Council  secretariat 
decided to make use of YouTube because it was cheap 
and easy. Javier Solana’s video statement, unfiltered 
and  direct  to  the  people,  was  criticized  by  older 
officials who feared the transparency would hurt the 
Union as a whole. In the words of one official, “What 
are you doing? We are discreet diplomats. We cannot 
go public like that. We need to come to agreement 
with  the  27  member  states  first.”
73  A  public 
environment  hurts  the  chances  of  a  diplomatic 
agreement being negotiated.  
The  EU  press  officer  arrived  in  Aceh  with  a 
“master  message”  agreed  upon  in  Brussels  to 
                                                      
69 Interviews with two Brussels based journalists on 7 
October 2011 and 5 March 2012. 
70 Stephen Castle, “As the E.U. does more, fewer to tell 
about it”, New York Times, 22 March 2010. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/23/business/global/23p
ress.html?_r=1 
71 Statistics on accredited journalists from 2002-2011 from 
the European Commission, DG Comm, Service de Porte 
Parole, received on 16 February 2012 in email 
correspondence.  
72 Interview with EU official IV, 4 October 2011, Brussels, 
Belgium. 
73 EU official III, 11 October 2011, Brussels, Belgium. 
guide  his  statements  to  the  press.  In  the  end, 
what was written up in the press would become 
the  ‘official’  version  of  the  mission.  However, 
the  press  officer  found  the  master  message  of 
limited use because it was so quickly overtaken 
by  events.  Once  the  journalists  had  heard  the 
same message, once, twice, or even three times, 
they  demanded  to  know  how  the  mission  was 
proceeding and to receive new information. The 
press officer had few options: ask the journalists 
to  wait  until  he  received  new  orders  from 
Brussels;  turn  them  away;  tell  them  the 
unvarnished  truth,  or  tell  them  the  truth  he 
thought would least embarrass or go against the 
master  message.  As  an  official  explained,  one 
must  be  flexible  during  crisis  missions. A major 
issue for the press officers is time: the EU wants time 
to negotiate a position and the journalists want their 
questions answered before their deadlines. However, 
it is a tricky business; getting the facts wrong could 
embarrass politicians back home.
74 
It could also embarrass the parties involved as well. In 
many developing countries, where the majority of 
missions take place, the press i s often not free. For 
example, foreign journalists and researchers require a 
special visa and approval of the topic ahead of time 
before entering Indonesia. To quote a retired General 
in Jakarta, “[Foreigners] take video pictures and speak 
unpleasant news around the province. The army’s job 
is to guarantee unity of Indonesia and we are willing 
to do everything to make sure of that.”
75 Allowing in 
outsiders was a great risk for the government, but the 
government had little choice considering that so many 
foreigners and foreign journalists had already entered 
the country either to aid or to cover the tsunami.  
Logistics: Location, location, location, and timing 
The remoteness of the CSDP operations also hindered 
international  and  European  media  coverage.  Very 
simply,  it  is  difficult  for  a  journalist  to  get  to  the 
mission  to  report  on  it.  For  example,  for  the  anti-
piracy mission, Operation  Atalanta, off  the coast of 
Somalia, a journalist would have to fly to Djibouti, a 
very  expensive  and  time  consuming  itinerary,  and, 
even if he or she did manage to get in touch with the 
naval  ships  in  the  Gulf  of  Aden,  a  very  big  ‘if’ 
considering  the  poor  transportation  infrastructure, 
the ships were at sea, the limited government in the 
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region  as  well  as  piracy,  there  were  no  satellites 
available to get the story back to Europe. With limited 
budgets and limited time, journalists often chose to 
direct their energies elsewhere. Moreover, back home 
at military headquarters in Norwood, England, the HQ 
had  no  desire  to  do  media  relations,  especially 
considering  that  the  headquarters  was  a  secure 
building  for  guarding  military  secrets.  However, 
Whitehall stepped in and insisted they speak to the 
press.
76  
The Council secretariat had its own strategy to get 
around  the  logistics  issue.  In   2007,  they  started 
sending  in  their  own  audio -visual  teams  to  make 
footage for television broadcasts, always being sure to 
film soldiers speaking in their own language  – Dutch, 
Danish,  etc,  and  not  the  more  widely  spoken 
languages  of  English  or  French.  The  goal  was  to 
provide attractive footage for the local and national 
market. They would then call up national newspapers 
and say “Did you know there were Dutch soldiers in 
this CSDP mission?” Making the local connections was 
the only way to get on the news.
77 
With  regard  to  the  local  media,  in  general,  the 
missions get little press coverage for several reasons. 
First, very often, the crisis itself precludes the normal 
functioning of local media. In other cases, the press is 
not free. Another issue is language : depending upon 
the region, there may not be people in the EU press 
office who speak the appropriate language to give 
interviews or to follow the local press coverage. The 
EU tries to send people with the pertinent linguistic 
skills, but sometimes it is n ot possible. In Aceh, the 
Brussels press officer was lucky that the UK embassy 
in Jakarta sent over a press officer, an Indonesian 
national named Faye Belnis, who could speak to local 
journalists in Bahasa Indonesia. The Brussels -based 
press officer gave o ut statements in English. Since 
1998, Indonesia also had a relatively free and active 
press.
78 Two of the main national journals, The Jakarta 
Post  and  Kompass,  had  a  large  number  of  articles. 
While ASEAN was a full participant, they sent mostly 
political appointees and military officers; they sent no 
                                                      
76 Interview with official in the Council press office, 2011. 
77 EU officials I and III corroborated this point. 
78 Freedom House lists Indonesia as having a moderately 
free press, less free than the West, but freer than other 
ASEAN countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, Cambodia, 
Laos, Myanmar, Brunei, or Vietnam. See Freedom House, 
Freedom of the Press 2012, www.freedomhouse.org.  
communications officer.
79  
Timing  is  also  an  issue.  To  quote  Andy  Warhol, 
everyone has his fifteen minutes of fame, that is, 
publicity  has  a  limited  window  of  opportunity.  In 
general, crisis missions are most int eresting for the 
first month; after that, they are old news. The same 
held  for  the  Aceh  Mission.  The  first  phase  of 
decommissioning of weapons happened from 15 -17 
September 2005 when 243 weapons were turned in 
by GAM and approved by the AMM.
80 As one official 
described it, it was incredibly busy with over 100 
interviews given out and photos taken.
81 Then, the 
news moment was over, and the photo ops of rebels 
handing over guns were gone. The seconded German 
diplomat went back to Jakarta, and the journalists 
went home.
82  
Practicalities of the Mission: Press Officers as Official 
Historians in Aceh 
While  Ahtisaari  did  not  want  the  media  involved 
during the negotiations, he did demand that the press 
be  free  to move about  Aceh  during the  monitoring 
phase: “A vigilant press, a population that knew what 
the  peace  agreement  was  about  and  the  total 
commitment  of  the  parties  would  be  the  real 
guarantee of the agreement’s success.”
83 
However,  the  mission  was  extremely  sensitive,  so 
much so that Council Joint Action that authorized the 
mission warned: “The Aceh Monitoring Mission will be 
conducted in a situation which may deteriorate and 
could  harm  the  objectives  of  the  Common  Foreign 
and  Security  Policy  as  set  out  in  Article  11  of  the 
Treaty”. To be clear, the enumerated and endangered 
objectives were: 
  to safeguard the common values, fundamental 
interests,  independence  and  integrity  of  the 
Union in conformity with the principles of the 
United Nations Charter, 
                                                      
79 Interview with EAS official in Brussels in second interview 
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80 First phase of re-location and decommissioning 
completed: Press release – 27 September 2005, 
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81 Interview with Andre Scholtz, German Foreign Ministry, 
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  to strengthen the security of the Union in all 
ways, 
  to preserve peace and strengthen international 
security,  in  accordance  with  the  principles  of 
the  United  Nations  Charter,  as  well  as  the 
principles  of  the  Helsinki  Final  Act  and  the 
objectives of the Paris Charter, including those 
on external borders, 
  to promote international cooperation, 
  to develop and consolidate democracy and the 
rule  of  law,  and  respect  for  human  right  and 
fundamental freedoms. 
Understandably, the staff was ordered to “act solely 
in the interest of the mission” and to “exercise the 
greatest  discretion  with  regard  to  all  facts  and 
information relating to the mission.”
84 
Moreover,  the  staff  could  not  be  merely  passive 
observers. Part of the AMM’s mandate was to rule on 
disputed  amnesty  cases,  to  investigate  and  rule  on 
complaints of alleged violations of the MoU, and to 
establish and maintain good cooperation among the 
parties.
85 As active participants charged with making 
rulings, acting in the interest of the mission, and with 
discretion regarding information, the press officer was 
not  tasked  with  promoti ng  the  EU  as  much  as 
becoming the official and impartial historian of the 
mission. 
For example, in one incident where people were shot 
and seriously injured, each side had a conflicting story 
to recount to the press officer. When there are two 
different versions, how does one determine what will 
be ‘official’? As a referee, he had to try to establish 
what  happened,  which  meant  that  the  issue  was 
raised in the Commission on Security Arrangements 
(COSA)  meetings,  the  weekly  and  later  monthly 
meetings of the heads of mission and the leaders of 
both sides. COSA was the centrepiece of the mission. 
If a problem arose, it was first discussed at this level. If 
there  were  still  issues,  it  went  to  the  district-level 
meeting, and so on up the ladder.  
Press  statements  following  COSA  meetings  were  an 
important tool. In many cases, the press officer wrote 
them in advance of the meeting based on the agenda: 
“The parties discussed x, y, and z”. At the end of each 
meeting, he would make changes, and amendments. 
                                                      
84 See Joint Action 2005/643/ CFSP, article 5.3. 
85 See Joint Action 2005/643/ CFSP, article 2. 
In  the  case  of  a  shooting  incident,  the  commission 
would go over the different versions, and state that 
they  would  submit  their  own  report  to  both  sides 
within  a  certain  number  of  days.  The  new  report 
would  go  to  the  head  of  mission  for  approval,  and 
then to the two sides for comments. In an example, 
the first press statement of the COSA was from 13 
October  2005.  It  reported  “A  shooting  incident  in 
Jeuram, Nagan Raya was discussed. All parties agreed 
to  fully  cooperate  on  this  issue.  The  parties  are 
collecting  information  and  have  agreed  to  establish 
the facts before processing this issue further.”
86 In the 
end, such press statements were not useful in getting 
press coverage, but they were instrumental in keeping 
the  peace  process  on  track.  In  doing  so,  the  press 
officer  kept  to  the  mission’s  mandate:  he  put  the 
interests  of  the  mission  first,  above  that  of  the  EU 
itself,  and  he  was  discrete  with  the  information.  In 
other words, his not seeking to promote the EU was 
partly  responsible  for  the  overall  success  of  the 
mission. 
Conclusion: Successful missions require a low profile 
In a briefing paper for the EU and ASEAN before the 
deployment  of  the  AMM,  Amnesty  International 
welcomed one of the goals of the MoU in section 5.2 
(d)  to  “monitor  the  human  rights  situation  and 
provide  assistance  in  this  field”.
87 It  exhorted  the 
monitors to document any violations or breaches. In 
the  end,  no  truth  and  reconciliation  tribunal  was 
established, and human rights was pushed to the back 
burner, but perhaps for the best. Schulze explains that 
the EU’s “lack of focus on implementing the human 
rights elements … made it possible for the AMM to 
complete  its  mission  in  the  sensitive  context  of 
Indonesia  domestic  politics,”  and  ascribes  it  as  a 
“lesson learned”.
88  
Justin Davies, Chief of Staff of the Monitoring Mission, 
attributes  AMM’s  success  to  the  principle  of  local 
ownership: “AMM was a peacekeeping operation and 
the  deployment  of  foreign  monitors  or  missions  is 
                                                      
86 Press Statement: On the outcome of the meeting of the 
Commission on Security Arrangements (COSA), Banda Aceh, 
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always a sensitive issue for a host country. Most of all, 
a successful peace process needs to be owned by the 
parties and the population concerned, not by foreign 
bodies. This concept of local ownership is a guiding 
principle  of  ESDP  and  one  of  great  importance  to 
AMM.”
89 
Juha  Christensen,  the  man  who  initiated  the  peace 
talks, believes in the importance of confidentiality to 
the peace process. He subsequently founded an NGO, 
Pacta, which highlights the value of private diplomacy: 
PACTA’s  approach  is  based  on  “confidentiality 
whenever  necessary,  transparency  whenever 
possible.”
90 
These  three  principles:  sensitivity  to  the  political 
situation, local ownership of the peace process, and 
confidentiality  are  key  to  a  successful  crisis 
management  mission.  All  of  these  lessons  learned 
focus on the need for the EU to be flexible, work in a 
secret environment, even to the point of sacrificing 
transparency, and keeping a low profile, if the peace 
building  is  to  succeed.  In  other  words,  EU  self-
promotion  is  at  odds  with  successful  crisis 
management.  
The  EU  is  in  a  bind  because  Laeken  Presidency 
conclusions asserted, rather melodramatically, that in 
order to bring the EU closer to its citizens, “The role it 
has to play is that of a power resolutely doing battle 
against all violence, all terror, and all fanaticism, but 
which also does not turn a blind eye to the world’s 
heartrending injustices.”
91 EU expeditions provide an 
opportunity  for  the  EU  to  be  ‘seen’  internationally; 
they  also  provide  an  opportunity  for  the  citizen  to 
become  wrapped  up  in  the  human  element  of  the 
story as well. Moral justice plays a large role in the 
formation  of  a  protagonist  in  the  creation  of  a 
national, or in this case, a European narrative. In other 
words, the EU must be seen as the ‘good cop’ in the 
media and in public statements. As Dan Nimmo and 
James Combes explained, the news media very often 
fulfill  social  and  psychological  functions  more  than 
                                                      
89 Justin Davies, “The Aceh Monitoring Mission: Securing 
Peace and Democracy”, The European Union and 
Peacebuilding: Policy and Legal Aspects. Steven Blockmans, 
Jan Wouters, and Tom Ruys (eds.) (The Hague: TMC Asser 
Press, 2010) 383. 
90 http://www.pacta.fi/mission  
91 European Council Presidency Conclusions, Laeken, 14-15 
December 2001, Annex I. 
intellectual or intelligence functions.
92Laurent Boussié, 
Correspondent for France 2 in the UK, noted at a 
conference hosted by the Strategic Studies Institute, 
that  the  “media  typically  focus  on  ‘sympathy’  and 
‘emotional’ issues without much regard for the whole 
truth.”
93 By employing the “melodramatic imperative” 
in political news, i.e., describing international events 
as a dramatic story of good versus evil, of us versus 
them,  the  news  creates  an  emotive  force  that  can 
mobilize  public  opinion.  Therefore,  the  viewer  will 
identify  with  what  is  happening  to  the  tourist, 
company,  or  diplomat  internationally  and  see  it  as 
personally affecting him or herself. Chosen judiciously, 
the right international event could increase the EU’s 
prestige and therefore enhance its identity.
94  
When carefully examined, perhaps one should not be 
surprised  that  successful  crisis  management  runs 
counter to such a policy. If the EU is the ‘good’ cop, 
who, in a sensitive political environment, should be 
labelled  the  ‘bad’?  Melodrama  may  make  for  good 
television,  but  melodrama  and  crisis  management 
usually create tragedy. Placing the emphasis on the 
success of the mission is the right lesson learned. 
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